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FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 5 Harl, Agricultural Law § 43.02[2]
(1992).  See also Hines, Estate Planning Iowa Joint
Tenancies, Monograph No. 7, Agricultural Law Center,
University of Iowa (1960).
2 Gallenstein v. U.S., 91-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 60,088 (E.D. Ky.
1991), aff'd, 92-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 60,114 (6th Cir. 1992).
3 I.R.C. § 2040, before amendment by the Tax Reform Act
of 1976.
4 I.R.C. § 2040(b).
5 I.R.C. § 2040(a).  See Est. of Stimson v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1992-242 (balance in joint bank accounts
included in gross estate even though daughters' names on
account for convenience in managing their affairs); Est.
of Hicks v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1977-215 (father-son
stock margin account).
6 Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a)(2).  See Est. of Hatchett v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1989-637 (estate met burden of
proof to extent of one-quarter of value that was
attributable to surviving spouse's inheritance from
parent); Hudson v. U.S., 79-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 13,292 (W.D.
Okla. 1979) (evidence did not show exact amount
contributed by survivor).
7 I.R.C. § 2040(b)(1), as enacted by Pub. L. 94-455, §
2002.
8 I.R.C. § 2515, before repeal by the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, § 403(c)(3)(B).  See
Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(b), -1(c)(1)(i).
9 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4).  See Rev. Rul. 68-269,
1968-1 C.B. 399.
1 0 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4).  See Est. of McCammon
v.Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1980-327 (withdrawal not in
contemplation of death).  See also Ltr. Rul. 8302020,
Oct. 5, 1982 (either mother (the contributor) or daughter
as joint tenants could withdraw from savings account;
gift occurred on withdrawal by daughter).
1 1 I.R.C. § 2040(d), before amendment by the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, § 403(c)(i).
1 2 Rev. Rul. 82-159, 1982-2 C.B. 210 (same rule if joint
tenancy terminated and reformed after 1979 and election
filed).
1 3 Rev. Rul. 82-159, 1982-2 C.B. 210.
1 4 I.R.C. § 2040(b).
1 5 Id.
1 6 See I.R.C. § 1014(b).
1 7 Gallenstein v. U.S., n. 2 supra.
1 8 Id.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSE. The plaintiff was injured when thrown from a
horse owned by the defendant. The court upheld a summary
judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff had no
evidence that the defendant had any knowledge of the horse's
propensity to throw its riders. Berneathy v. Pursley,
832 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
The plaintiff was injured when thrown from a horse
owned by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was liable under the Animal Control Act, Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 8, ¶ 366, which holds animal owners liable for the
attacks and injuries caused by the animal. The court held that
the Act did not apply to horse riders who voluntarily assume
control of the animal which injured them. Ennen v .
White, 598 N.E.2d 416 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . Prior to filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor was involved in a suit against a
manufacturer of cattle feed for damages resulting from
defective feed. Prior to 90 days before filing for bankruptcy,
the debtor assigned to a creditor a portion of the anticipated
damages. The debtor received the damage award within the 90
days before filing for bankruptcy and the creditor received the
portion of the award before the bankruptcy case commenced.
The court held that the transfer to the creditor was not
avoidable as a preferential transfer because the effective date
of the transfer was the date the assignment of the damage
award was executed, not the date the award was paid to the
creditor. In re Wagner, 144 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N . D .
Iowa 1992).
DISCHARGE. The debtors had leased dairy cows from
the creditor under contract. Over the several years of the
contract relationship, the parties kept informal and often
inaccurate account of the number of cows under the lease.
The creditor terminated the lease and recovered most of the
cows and sued for damages for the missing cows. A state
court judgment awarded the creditor damages and the debtor
filed for bankruptcy. The creditor sought to have the
judgment declared nondischargeable under Sections 523(a)(4),
(6). The court held that the debt was dischargeable because
(1) the lease did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship as
required by Section 523(a)(4) and (2) the loss of the cows,
while a breach of contract, was more the result of sloppy
accounting over the years by both parties than embezzlement
or larceny as required by Section 523(a)(6). In re
Hoffman, 144 B.R. 459 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1992).
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor had received a life
estate in a farm by testamentary bequest from the debtor's
parent. The debtor mortgaged the farm and after defaulting on
the secured loan, entered into a settlement with the lender for
$80,000 which was placed in a spendthrift trust for the
debtor. A bankruptcy creditor challenged the trust as
fraudulent because a settlor cannot be a beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust. The debtor argued that the trust was
established by either the lender or the court and was valid.
The court held that the trust was established by the debtor as
part of the default settlement and was included the trust
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property in the bankruptcy estate. In re  Morris, 1 4 4
B.R. 401 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992).
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS. Four months before
filing for bankruptcy, the debtors entered into a contract for
deed to sell a ranch purchased by the debtors one month
earlier. One month before the filing for bankruptcy, the
transaction was closed with the buyer paying the
downpayment and the deed being placed in escrow until the
final installment was paid. The debtors sought assumption
of the contract but two creditors related to the original owner
objected and sought rejection so that they could purchase the
ranch for $5,000 more than the buyer paid. The court held
that where substantial performance by the buyer had been
made and payments were current, the contract should be
assumed. The court noted that rejection of the contract would
not necessarily have helped the objecting creditors because
the rejection acted only as a breach of the contract and not a
rescission. In re  Seymour, 144 B.R. 524 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS
RETIREMENT PLANS. The court held that the debtor's
interest in an ERISA qualified profit-sharing plan was not
estate property. In re  Sirois, 144 B.R. 12 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1992); In re Greif, 144 B.R. 2 0 6
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
GRAIN ELEVATORS. The claimants were farmers
who had stored beans in elevators operated by the debtor
through a corporation owned by the debtor. The claimants
had filed claims against the corporation in its bankruptcy
case and now proceeded against the debtor individually for
conversion of the stored beans. The claimants also sought
priority for their claims under Section 507(a)(5)(A) as grain
producers. The court held that the claims would be allowed
to the extent the claimants had not received payment from
the corporation's bankruptcy case but that no priority would
be allowed because the proceeds of the beans were property
of the corporation's bankruptcy estate. In re  Hawkins,
144 B.R. 481 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992).
SETOFF . The debtors were farmers who filed for
bankruptcy in November 1991. The debtors applied for
disaster payments for their 1990 and 1991 crops. The FmHA
petitioned for relief from the automatic stay to offset claims
against the debtors against the disaster payments. The court
found that although the disaster payments in general were
authorized by the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade
Act of 1990, the specific appropriations were not made until
the 1991 Emergency Crop Loss Assistance Act, signed in
December 1991. Thus, the debtors were not entitled to the
disaster payments until after the filing of the petition and
setoff was denied to the FmHA. In re Young, 144 B . R .
45 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
  CHAPTER 7  
DISCHARGE. More than one year before filing for
bankruptcy but just after a creditor accelerated secured loans
to the debtors, the debtors transferred several items of
collateral to trusts for their minor children, although the
debtors continued to make use of the property. The court
held that the trusts were shams and that the transfers were
made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.
Although the transfers were made more than one year before
the bankruptcy filing, the court held that the debtors would
not be granted a discharge because the concealment of the
assets in the trust was continuous. In re  Debruin, 1 4 4
B.R. 90 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1992).
  CHAPTER 11  
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE. The debtors were
partners in a farm partnership. The debtors' Chapter 11 plan
provided for retention of the farm, reduction of the secured
claims to the value of the collateral, and 10 percent payment
of all unsecured claims.  In order to satisfy the new
investment exception to the absolute priority rule, the
debtors stated that a debt from their father would be released,
thus contributing $20,000 in equipment which secured the
debt and $10,000 which would have been paid on the
unsecured portion of the debt. The court held that the plan
did not satisfy the exception because the contributed money
was not new money and was not substantial in relation to
the value of the unsecured claims. In re  Snyder, 1 4 4
B.R. 393 (C.D. Ill. 1990), aff'g , 99 B.R. 8 8 5
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989).
  CHAPTER 12  
DISMISSAL . The debtor's first plan provided that a
bank with a secured interest in all farm equipment, livestock
and feed would be paid nothing because an anticipated
lawsuit against the bank for breach of loan commitments
would produce an award greater than the amount owed to the
bank. The court rejected this plan as too speculative. The
second amended plan of the debtors provided for the sale of
the bank's collateral with the proceeds used to pay another
secured creditor and the bank to receive a second mortgage on
the debtor's ranch. The court also rejected this plan and
dismissed the case because the bank would not retain its lien
on its claim as required by Section 1225(a)(5). In re
Ames, 973 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1992).
PLAN . The debtor's Chapter 12 plan provided for
payment of bankruptcy related attorney's fees monthly over
the five years of the plan. The attorneys objected, arguing
that the fees, as administrative expenses, were required to be
paid before any other unsecured claims were paid. The court
held that Section 1226(b)(1) allowed the payment of
administrative expenses over the life of the plan. In re
Palombo, 144 B.R. 516 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).
SETOFF.  The debtors had enrolled farm land in the
CRP and were indebted to the FmHA on a loan secured by
the debtor's land but subordinated to a security interest in the
same land granted to the FCS. The FmHA sought
administrative setoff of the CRP payments or at least
elevation of its unsecured claim to secured status to the
extent of the allowable setoff. The court held that although
the FmHA was eligible to set off the CRP payments, the
setoff would not be allowed because the CRP payments were
necessary for the successful reorganization of the debtors and
were used to pay off the priority claim of the FSC. In re
Lincoln, 144 B.R. 498 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992).
TRUSTEE FEES.  The court held that the Bankruptcy
Court did not abuse its discretion to require Chapter 12 plan
payments of impaired claims to be made through the trustee
and made subject to the trustee's fees.  In re  Fulkrod,
973 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1992), aff'g , 126 B . R .
584 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
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AUTOMATIC STAY . After the debtor had paid the
tax claims under the debtor's plan, the IRS served notices of
intent to levy and made several levies against the debtor's
property for payment of the taxes already paid in the
bankruptcy case. The debtor petitioned for an injunction
against future levies and monetary damages. The court held
that the debtor's action was barred by sovereign immunity
and that Section 106 did not waive the immunity because the
IRS no longer had a claim in the case since the taxes had
been paid. In re  Unroe, 144 B.R. 85 (Bankr. S . D .
Ind. 1992).
The IRS had filed a prepetition tax lien against the
debtor's residence. After the debtor received a discharge, the
IRS filed a notice to levy against the house. The debtor
argued that the limitations period for collection of the tax
had expired because the tolling of the limitations period by
the bankruptcy case occurred only for the period in which the
IRS needed to apply for relief from the automatic stay. The
court held that the limitations period was tolled during the
entire bankruptcy case because the IRS had no duty, by
statute or otherwise, to apply for relief from the automatic
stay. Wekell v. U.S., 144 B.R. 503 (W.D. Wash.
1992) .
After the debtors had filed for bankruptcy and the plan
was confirmed, the IRS filed a notice of intent to levy on the
debtors. The debtors notified the IRS of the pending
bankruptcy case but the IRS levied against the debtors'
wages. The debtors sought compensation and costs resulting
from the IRS violation of the automatic stay. The court held
that Sections 106 and 362 provided a waiver of governmental
immunity for the action to recover monetary damages. In re
Tyson, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 5 2 7
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The IRS had filed a tax lien
against the debtors' residence and personal property. The
debtors sought a determination of the secured amount of the
lien based on a determination of the value of the residence
and also sought avoidance of the lien, under Section 506(a),
to the extent the lien was unsecured. The court held that the
value of the home for purposes of the tax lien was the forced
tax sale valuation and not the fair market value. The court
also held that under Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773
(1992), Section 506(a) did not void unsecured liens. In re
Taffi, 144 B.R. 105 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992).
DISCHARGE. The debtor was a partner in a
partnership which had received a Notice of Final Partnership
Administrative Adjustment for 1983 which was still
contested during the bankruptcy case. The IRS also filed a
notice of deficiency to the debtor for additional taxes arising
out of the the FPAA and the debtor was contesting that
notice at the time of the bankruptcy filing. After the debtor
received a discharge, the debtor sought a ruling that the 1983
additional taxes were dischargeable as a general unsecured
claim. The court held that because the taxes were still
assessable upon the filing for bankruptcy, the taxes were not
dischargeable under Sections 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) and 523. In re
Crawford, 144 B.R. 346 (Bankr W.D. Tex .
1992) .
The debtor's sought the discharge of federal income taxes
for taxable years for which tax returns were filed late but
more than two years before filing for bankruptcy. The
debtors did not pay the taxes owed when the returns were
filed because the debtors made bad business investments and
spent too much on their lavish lifestyle. The IRS argued that
the debtors' failure to make any payments was an attempt to
evade or defeat their tax obligations. The court held that the
taxes were dischargeable because the IRS failed to establish
that the failure to pay the taxes was willful. In re
Sonnenberg, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,531 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
PLAN . Various local, state and federal tax authorities
objected to the debtor's Chapter 11 plan which provided for
100 percent payment of all tax claims but the payments were
not to start until one year after the plan began, with interest
accruing during the deferral period. The court held that the
plan should be approved as fair and equitable, proposed in
good faith, and reasonably necessary for a successful
reorganization. In re  Gregory Boat Co., 144 B . R .
361 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992).
TAX LIEN. The IRS filed a notice of tax lien before
the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The IRS argued that the lien
attached to money owed to the debtor by a third party. The
court held that the tax lien did not attach to the money
because the IRS did not have possession of the money. In
re  Merida Tiles Corp., 144 B.R. 550 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1992).
CONTRACTS
BREACH. The plaintiff's corn crop was damaged by a
herbicide manufactured by the defendant. The defendant's
agents had inspected the damaged crop and had agreed that the
herbicide caused the damage. The agents agreed to pay the
plaintiff for replanting costs and for lost yield based upon a
random harvest sample. The agents worked with the plaintiff
in obtaining the harvest sample and in calculating the yield
loss. After the plaintiff submitted the request for replanting
costs and yield losses, the defendant offered a reduced amount
in settlement of the claim. The plaintiff filed suit after the
parties failed to agree on a settlement amount. The court held
that the parties had entered into a contract for the damages
and that the defendant's failure to pay the contract amount
was a breach. The court found that the actions of the agents
and the settlement negotiations supported the existence of
the contract. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 8 3 4
S.W.2d 136 (Ark. 1992).
CATTLE. The plaintiff had entered into a contract with
the defendants to have the defendants feed and breed cattle
owned by the plaintiff. After the plaintiff decided to raise the
cattle himself, the parties entered into a stipulation as to
how many steers, bred heifers and calves were to be delivered
from the herds cared for by the defendants. The plaintiff sued
for breach of contract when the cattle delivered did not meet
the stipulated numbers and many of the cattle were unfit for
breeding because of age or failure of the defendants to Bangs
vaccinate the cattle. The court awarded damages for the loss
of value for the cattle which were not Bangs vaccinated
because the defendants knew that the cattle were to be used
for breeding. Mash v. Cutler, 488 N.W.2d 6 4 2
(S.D. 1992).
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CORPORATIONS
DISSOLUTION. The plaintiff was a 50 percent
shareholder in a farm corporation and sought dissolution of
the corporation because of deadlock and oppressive
management by the defendants. The defendants were the
plaintiff's brother and spouse. The trial court had granted
summary judgment, under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.494, on the
dissolution action because both parties had a 50 percent share
and because the brother and spouse had made loans to their
children, had terminated the life insurance for the plaintiff
and had slaughtered corporation cattle for use by the
employees. The appellate court reversed, holding that
although the trial court was allowed the discretion to order
dissolution, sufficient facts were in dispute to provide
grounds for relief other than dissolution. Struckhoff v .
Echo Ridge Farm, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 463 (Mo .
Ct. App. 1992).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM. The
defendant was the son of the plaintiff farm owner and had
operated the family farm for several years after the death of
the father. The defendant had enrolled land in the federal
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) but had not obtained
the signatures of the plaintiff or other family members who
owned an interest in the land. After the defendant ceased
managing the farm, the plaintiff informed the ASCS that the
CRP contract was not signed by all owners and the ASCS
required a new contract to be signed. The defendant refused to
sign the new contract and the contract was terminated, with
the ASCS seeking over $16,000 in liquidated damages. The
jury found that the defendant acted maliciously in refusing to
sign the new contract but awarded only $1,100 in damages.
The court upheld the jury verdict as not so grossly out of
proportion to the actual damages so as to shock the
conscience. Hansen v. Hansen, 835 P.2d 7 4 8
(Mont. 1992).
COTTON. The CCC has issued proposed regulations
which provide for a 1993 ELS cotton acreage diversion of
between 15 and 25 percent and no paid diversion program.
57 Fed. Reg. 48748 (Oct. 28, 1992).
EGGS. The AMS has issued proposed regulations
establishing storage temperature and labeling requirements
for table eggs. 57 Fed. Reg. 48569 (Oct. 27, 1992).
HERBICIDES. The plaintiff planted a corn crop after
application of the herbicide Dual manufactured by the
defendant. After the crop was damaged by a heavy rain which
caused the herbicide to adversely affect the germination of the
corn seed, the plaintiff sued in tort for failure to adequately
warn about the risk of use of the herbicide when high
moisture is available soon after planting. The defendant
argued that the herbicide was registered under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act which preempted
state tort actions involving inadequate warnings on labels.
The court held that FIFRA did not preempt such state tort
actions. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d
136 (Ark. 1992).
PESTICIDES. The plaintiffs filed an action for
damages against the manufacturer of a termicide sprayed in
the plaintiffs' home, alleging that the defendant manufacturer
failed to warn about the dangers of the termicide. The
defendant argued and the court held that the FIFRA
preempted state court tort actions based on failure to
adequately label registered pesticides. Davidson v .
Velsicol Chemical, 834 P.2d 931 (Nev. 1992).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS. At the
date of death, the decedent was owed $215,000 by a nephew
on a promissory note. The estate valued the note at less than
fair market value for estate tax purposes because the nephew
was insolvent. The decedent's will cancelled all debts from
family members, including the nephew, who also received a
bequest for over $1 million.  The IRS ruled that the note
could be valued for less than fair market value because of the
nephew's insolvency. The IRS also ruled that the
cancellation of the promissory notes was not income to the
estate because the cancellation was made with donative intent
and the estate never became an obligor of the notes. Ltr.
Rul. 9240003, June 17, 1992.
DISCLAIMERS. The taxpayer received by intestate
succession shares of stock owned by the decedent spouse.
The corporation made a distribution by check to the
decedent's estate and the taxpayer's son deposited the check
into a survivorship bank account owned by the taxpayer. The
taxpayer had no knowledge of the distribution until after the
check was deposited. The taxpayer disclaimed 250 shares of
the stock and the portion of the distribution resulting from
those shares. The IRS held that the disclaimer was effective.
Ltr. Rul. 9243024, July 23, 1992.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX.
In 1969 and 1972, the taxpayer established trusts for the
taxpayer's children and their issue. The trustees had the
discretion to distribute income and principal to the
beneficiaries. The trusts terminated at the earlier of the date
the youngest grandchild reached age 35 or the expiration of
21 years after the death of the last beneficiary alive at the
execution of the trusts. The taxpayer's children had a special
power of appointment over trust corpus to any of their issue.
The IRS ruled that the irrevocable trusts were not subject to
GSTT because no additions were made to the trusts after
September 25, 1985 and that the testamentary appointment
of the trust property to trusts for the taxpayer's grandchildren
did not subject the second trusts to GSTT. Ltr. R u l .
9241025, July 9, 1992.
In 1966 and 1967 the grantors established irrevocable
trusts for their children with remainders passing to the issue
of the beneficiaries. The trusts originally had only
independent trustees but the trusts were modified to provide
for trustees who were also beneficiaries but the trusts
provided that trustees who were also beneficiaries could not
participate in trustee discretionary distributions of trust
principal. The IRS ruled that the modifications would not
subject the trusts to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9242011, July
17, 1992.
GIFT. The taxpayer transferred a life estate interest in
six fine art pieces to a spouse. The life estate granted the
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spouse full use and enjoyment of the art and the right to sell
the life estate but no power to sell the art pieces. The
remainder interest in the art passed to a charitable
organization. The IRS ruled that the transfer was a gift
eligible for the gift tax marital deduction as QTIP. The IRS
also ruled that the passing of the remainder interest to the
charitable organization would be eligible for a charitable
deduction to the spouse's estate if the taxpayer makes a gift
tax QTIP election as to the life estate interest. Ltr. R u l .
9242006, July 15, 1992.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE
TAX . The decedent's estate elected to pay state and federal
estate taxes in installments. The estate filed supplemental
Form 706 returns with each installment claiming the interest
paid with the deferred payments as a deduction and
recomputing the federal estate tax. The IRS ruled that under
Rev. Proc. 81-27, 1981-2 C.B. 548, this was the proper
procedure. Ltr. Rul. 9241002, June 23, 1992.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION. Under a revocable
trust agreement, upon the death of the predeceased spouse,
the trust was split into a marital share and a decedent's share,
with the marital share to be funded with so much of the
predeceased spouse's estate so as to reduce the federal estate
tax to zero. The trustee had the discretion of choosing the
property for the marital share. The predeceased spouse's
estate contained stock in a farm corporation for which special
use valuation was elected. The trustee first determined the
dollar amount to be included in the marital trust in order to
reduce the estate tax to zero, then the trust valued the stock
at the fair market value to determine the number of shares to
transfer to the marital trust share. The resulting number of
shares was then included in the decedent's gross estate at their
fair market value. The IRS argued that the shares should
have been valued at the special use valuation for the purpose
of determining the number of shares distributed to the
marital trust share. The court held that the trustee's method
was proper. Simpson v. U.S., 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 60,118 (D. N.M. 1992).
VALUATION. In 1986, the taxpayer corporation
recapitalized and issued common stock with a par value of
$50 and one vote per share, and preferred stock with a par
value of $1 and 10 votes per share. In 1992, the par value of
the common stock was changed to $5 and 10 times as many
shares were issued. At the same time, the votes per share of
the preferred stock were changed to 100. The IRS ruled that
the stock was not subject to the I.R.C. § 2701 rules because
the original stock issue occurred before October 9, 1990, and
the subsequent modification did not change the terms and
conditions of the stock and the voting proportions remained
the same between the common stock and preferred stock.
Ltr. Rul. 9241014, July 8, 1992.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
DEPRECIATION. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations relating to the applicable conventions for the
accelerated cost recovery system. T.D. 8444, Oct. 2 9 ,
1992 .
EMPLOYEE. The taxpayer worked on a dairy farm as a
milker. The dairy had the authority to supervise and control
the taxpayer's time and methods of work. The taxpayer was
paid a salary with a guaranteed minimum. The taxpayer
could be terminated without liability to the dairy. The
taxpayer did not have other business assets or office or
perform milking services for other dairies. The IRS ruled
that the taxpayer was an employee of the dairy for federal
withholding tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9241017, July 8 ,
1992 .
INSTALLMENT REPORTING. A decedent's estate
sold several parcels of real property for cash and 10-year
promissory notes. The estate's income tax return elected to
report the gain on the installment method and the estate
provided no evidence that it intended to elect out of the
installment method at that time. After the obligors on the
notes declared bankruptcy, the estate filed an amended return
electing out of the installment method. After an audit, the
estate learned that permission was required to revoke an
installment method election but the estate waited almost a
year to provide the necessary information so that a request to
revoke the election could be made. The IRS ruled that a
revocation would not be allowed. Ltr. Rul. 9243004 ,
June 2, 1992.
The taxpayer hired a tax return preparer to prepare the
taxpayer's return for a taxable year in which the taxpayer sold
a residence for cash and an installment note. The taxpayer
relied on the return preparer to report the taxes with the
minimum tax liability but the preparer reported all of the
gain but none of the interest from the sale of the residence.
After the taxpayer obtained other tax advice and discovered
the election out of the installment method, the taxpayer
sought revocation of the election. The IRS allowed the
revocation. Ltr. Rul. 9243019, July 22, 1992.
LETTER RULINGS. The IRS has announced
reduction of user fees for multiple letter rulings involving
substantially identical issues for members of a common
entity. Rev. Proc. 92-90, I.R.B. 1992-46.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayer
corporation originally owned agricultural land but granted a
series of ground leases to several parcels to a second
corporation which improved the land and built office
buildings on the parcels. Because of stricter requirements by
lenders, the second corporation needed complete fee interests
in the parcels it wanted to develop and exchanged the
taxpayer's interest in several parcels for the second
corporation's ground leases in other parcels, including some
which had partial improvements. The IRS ruled that because
the exchange was separate from the original ground lease
transactions and had a commercial purpose, the exchange was
not subject to the step transaction doctrine. Thus, the
exchange qualified for like-kind tax deferral under I.R.C.
1031. Ltr. Rul. 9243038, July 27, 1992.
PARTNERSHIPS
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS INCOME. The
IRS has ruled that an allocation of partnership discharge of
indebtedness income to partners which is not made in
accordance with the partners' share of the indebtedness has
substantial economic effect only if the partners are required
to restore any negative capital account balances. Rev. R u l .
92-97, I.R.B. 1992-46.
The IRS has announced that it will not challenge the
purchase price adjustment of an indebtedness of a bankrupt or
insolvent partnership so long as the transaction would
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qualify for the purchase price adjustment under I.R.C. §
108(e)(5) but for the bankruptcy or insolvency of the
partnership. Rev. Proc. 92-92, I.R.B. 1992-46.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES . The taxpayer
defaulted on $1 million debt, 60 percent of which was
allocated to passive activity expenditures. The taxpayer
satisfied the debt by transfer of property to the lender with a
fair market value of $800,000 and a basis of $700,000. The
IRS ruled that 60 percent, $120,000, of the discharge of
indebtedness income, $200,000, was passive activity
income. Rev. Rul. 92-92, I.R.B. 1992-45.
RETIREMENT PLANS . The IRS has issued a
model notice of direct rollover options which employers may
use to notify retirement plan recipients of their right to
rollover plan distributions. Notice 92-48, I .R.B.
1992-45 .
S CORPORATIONS.
TERMINATION. An S corporation had three trusts as
shareholders which improperly filed income tax returns to
show the accumulation of all income. The returns were
amended to properly show the distribution of all income to
the beneficiaries. The IRS ruled that the S corporation status
did not terminate as a result of the improperly filed trust
returns. Ltr. Rul. 9240041, July 8, 1992.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT. The taxpayer was an elected
member of the board of a rural electric nonprofit cooperative.
The board members received compensation for services
provided in the management of the cooperative. The IRS
ruled that the compensation received was self-employment
income to the taxpayer. Ltr. Rul. 9240012, July 1 ,
1992 .
SPECIAL ALERT
Because of the veto of H.R. 11, the 2 5
percent deduction for health insurance
premiums for self-employed persons expired
June 30, 1992.
NEGLIGENCE
DUTY . The plaintiff was a employee of the defendant
corn processor. The plaintiff alleged injury to the plaintiff's
heart from inhaling fumes from "steepwater" while loading
the material into truck tanks. Steepwater is the remaining
fluid from the processing of corn into several byproducts.
The court upheld a summary judgment for the defendant
because the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that the
injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable by the defendant in
that none of the ingredients in the steepwater were known to
be a danger to hearts. McCullough v. Amstar Corp. ,
833 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
PARTNERSHIPS
DISSOLUTION. The parties had formed a farm
partnership which owned land in South Dakota. After a
creditor brought an action for foreclosure because of the
default by the partnership on several loans, one partner
petitioned for an accounting and dissolution of the
partnership. The trial court entered a dissolution order for the
sale of the property in South Dakota and distribution of the
proceeds. The other partners argued that the North Dakota
trial court had no jurisdiction over the South Dakota land.
The court held that the dissolution order affected only the
partners individually, requiring them to execute the necessary
deeds and that the deeds executed in South Dakota made the
transfer, not the trial court order. First Nat'l Bank o f
Belfield v. Candee, 488 N.W.2d 391 ( N . D .
1992) .
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY. In 1983, the
plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement to operate a
cotton gin and farm on land purchased for the partnership.
Mortgage payments for the land were included in partnership
expenses and partnership income tax returns. Although the
property was not placed in the name of the partnership, the
court held that the intent of the parties was that the land be
partnership property. Crowe v. Smith, 603 S.2d 3 0 1
(Miss. 1992).
PROPERTY
EASEMENT BY NECESSITY. The plaintiffs
owned land-locked farm land which was accessible only by a
private road owned by the defendant. One plaintiff's land
became land locked as a result of a conveyance partitioning
the land to the defendant and plaintiff. Because the
conveyance created the land-locked tract, the court held that
the plaintiff received an easement by necessity to use the
defendant's road for access. Another plaintiff did not receive
the land-locked land in a partition but had received
permission from the defendant to use the road. Without use
of the road, the second plaintiff would have had to traverse a
quicksand stream or a steep hill; therefore, the court held that
the defendant's grant of permission was irrevocable because a
revocation would operate as a fraud on the plaintiff. Martin
v. See, 598 N.E.2d 321 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
DRAINAGE. The plaintiff owned farm land on to
which water drained from the defendant's land. The defendant
constructed a drainage ditch to collect surface water from the
eastern half of the property and caused the water to drain
through the western natural drainage on to the plaintiff's
property. The additional flow did not cause flooding but did
add to the deposit of silt on the plaintiff's property. The
plaintiff filed actions under the Shorelines Management Act
(SMA), in nuisance, and in trespass for damages and an
injunction against further use of the new ditch. The court
held that the plaintiff could not bring an action under the
SMA because only the state could use the Act to obtain an
injunction and the plaintiff failed to show any actual damage
to the plaintiff's property to support a monetary judgment.
The court also held that the defendant should be enjoined
from using the ditch because the ditch altered the natural
flow of drainage on the east side of the property to the west
side. The court held that the "common enemy" doctrine did
not apply because the western drainage was increased by the
defendant's ditch. Hedlund v. White, 836 P.2d 2 5 0
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
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SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
SALE OF COLLATERAL. The plaintiff and
brother operated a farm partnership which borrowed
operating money from the defendant bank which was secured
by farm equipment. After the partnership defaulted on the
loans, the bank repossessed the collateral and privately sold
it without giving notice to the partners. After discovering
the error, the bank allowed the brother to bid on the
collateral. After the brother submitted a bid for one dollar
more, the bank gave notice of the bids to the plaintiff and
brother. The plaintiff did not bid on the equipment. The
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the bank was
prohibited from seeking any deficiency because of lack of
notice and a commercially unreasonable sale of the
collateral. The court held that the sale was not commercially
unreasonable because the price received exceeded the fair
market value of the equipment. The court also held that a
deficiency would not be barred by the lack of notice because
(1) the debt did not involve the purchase of the collateral,
(2) the amount of collateral sold without notice was minor
compared to the total amount of collateral, and (3) the
plaintiff still had sufficient opportunity to guarantee the
best price for the sale of the remaining collateral. Knierim
v. First State Bank, 488 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa C t .
App. 1992).
ZONING
AGRICULTURAL USE . The petitioner's land was
zoned such that farm buildings could be built only on a
parcel which "is planted in perennials capable of producing
upon harvest, an average of at least $10,000 in gross annual
income." The petitioner's land had strawberries planted on it
but the plants had not and could not produce sufficient
income to meet the zoning requirements, but the petitioner
planned to replant the crop to increase the yield in the future
to meet the gross income requirement. The court upheld the
refusal of the building permit, holding that the zoning
ordinance required the currently planted crop to be able to
produce the gross income required. McKay Creek
Valley Ass'n v. Washington County, 834 P.2d
482 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
CITATION UPDATES
Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r,
974 F.2d 422 (3d Cir. 1992), aff'g , T.C. Memo.
1991-326 (safe harbor leasing) see p. 170 supra.
ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 1992, Pub. L .
No. 102-486, was signed into law on October 24, 1992.
See p. 177 supra.
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